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Abstract Small businesses, the majority of Spanish firms, rarely file for formal bank-
ruptcy when dealing with financial distress. This is why business bankruptcy rates in
Spain are among the lowest in the world, even during the current economic crisis.
To explain this fact we present the following hypothesis. Filing for bankruptcy in
Spain is very costly for both small firms and their creditors. Due to this, the capital
structure of micro firms is biased towards mortgage loans, as it allows them to avoid
bankruptcy by carrying out debt enforcement via mortgage foreclosures, which are
cheaper procedures than bankruptcy, in case of financial distress. The empirical tests
of our hypothesis consist of comparing the observed choices (choice of capital struc-
ture, choice between bankruptcy and mortgage) of Spanish firms with those of firms
from countries (France and the UK) where their bankruptcy systems are more efficient
and their laws do not incentivise them to bias their capital structure towards mortgage
loans. Our findings corroborate the proposed hypothesis. As bankruptcy procedures
and mortgage foreclosures are not perfect substitutes—i.e., they do not suit well the
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same type of firms- the underutilization of one of them—reflected in low bankruptcy
rates- may lead to efficiency losses.
Keywords Bankruptcy · Mortgage · Insolvency
JEL Classification G33 · G21 · K0
1 Introduction
Business bankruptcy rates (ratio of the number of business bankruptcy filings to the
number of business exits) in Spain are among the lowest in the world, which means
that Spanish firms rarely enter a formal bankruptcy procedure. The goal of this paper
is to explain this empirical observation, which may imply that economic agents regard
the system as inefficient and try to deal with financial distress in alternative ways.1
For that purpose we employ a large sample of Spanish, French and UK firms, finding
that small businesses in Spain, unlike their European counterparts, rely on mortgage
foreclosures2 as the main alternative to bankruptcy proceedings.
According to Table 1 Spain had the second lowest bankruptcy rate out of 26 coun-
tries, including both high-income and emerging economies, in 2006. An even more
striking observation is the difference in the orders of magnitude between Spain and
other developed economies: for instance, while there were around 29 bankruptcies per
100 firm exits in France and 16 in the UK, there were 0.3 in Spain. Only the deep eco-
nomic crisis that Spain is currently experiencing has modestly increased the number
of bankruptcy filings, but the Spanish bankruptcy rate was still one of the lowest in
the world in 2010 (see Table 1).
In contrast with the low incidence of business bankruptcies, business mortgage
foreclosures have soared during the crisis. While around 8,000 firms filed for bank-
ruptcy in 2012, there were nearly 26,000 business mortgage foreclosures3 in the same
year. Moreover, the latter figure must be considered a lower bound, since small busi-
ness owners may finance their firms with loans secured on their homes (Berkowitz and
1 Following Djankov et al. (2008), by “bankruptcy” we mean a legal procedure that imposes court super-
vision over the financial affairs of a firm or individual that has broken its promises to creditors or honours
them with difficulty, and whose possible outcomes are reorganisation or liquidation. By “financial distress”
we mean a situation in which a firm is close to default and it needs to take corrective action, such a selling
major assets, merging with another firm or filing for bankruptcy (Ross et al. 2005). See Appendix A for a
discussion on the legal terms used in this paper.
2 A foreclosure is “a debt enforcement procedure aimed at recovering the money owed to secured creditors”
(Djankov et al. 2008). There are different types of foreclosures depending on which collateral can be
repossessed using a single execution procedure. Since this paper concentrates on the analysis of small firms
and entrepreneurs, and land and buildings are the main assets that can be pledged as collateral by them,
we will focus on “mortgage over land and buildings” foreclosures (henceforth, mortgage foreclosures). In
other words, by “mortgage” we will mean a loan secured by land and buildings, and not by other types
of collateral. This is a necessary remark because there are other types of mortgages in some legal systems
such as the British one. For more details see Appendix A.
3 Source: Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012) and Registradores de España (2012).
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Table 1 Business bankruptcy
rates around the world
Business bankruptcy rates are
computed as the ratio of the
number of business bankruptcy
filings to the number of business
exits, in %. They include the
figures for individual
entrepreneurs, except in the UK,
where they only represent
companies. To enhance
comparability across countries,
we do not take into account exits
from industries with high public
sector presence (education,
health, social and personal
service activities). Source
authors’ computations with data
from Euler Hermes (2007,
2011), Eurostat, OECD and
national sources
Country Business bankruptcy
rate (2006)
Business bankruptcy
rate (2010)
Poland 0.3 0.3
Spain 0.4 1.7
South Korea 0.6 0.2
Greece 1.1 –
Czech Republic 1.2 2.0
Portugal 1.5 2.4
Singapore 1.5 1.0
Brazil 5.3 0.6
Ireland 3.2 4.9
Italy 4.0 3.7
Slovak Republic 4.5 2.8
USA 4.8 3.9
Canada 9.2 7.9
Denmark 9.5 24.1
Finland 11.7 10.8
Germany 12.2 13.6
Netherlands 12.4 13.7
UK 16.2 14.0
Hungary 16.8 29.3
Sweden 17.9 17.9
Norway 19.6 24.3
France 28.5 31.3
Austria 28.8 32.3
Belgium 30.0 51.6
Luxembourg 30.6 43. 5
Switzerland 43.6 –
Australia – 4.9
Estonia – 13.8
Latvia – 14.6
Lithuania – 2.7
Hong Kong 0.9
White 2004) but, if lenders repossess the collateral, they will be reflected as residential
foreclosures in the official statistics.
However, the use of bankruptcy procedures by Spanish businesses varies widely
depending on the size of the distressed firms, as shown in Fig. 1. While the rates
of micro firms (businesses with less than 10 employees) were around 0.15 % in
2006 and they have just reached 1.3 % during the economic crisis, those of non-
micro firms were 10.4 % in 2006 and they have increased up to 90 % during the
crisis, in line with the aggregate rates of developed countries. Since micro firms
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Fig. 1 Bankruptcy rates by size in Spain. Data are quaterly except for the first period 04C3 (last 4 months
of 2004). Rates are annualized. Source: authors’ calculations on data from the Spanish National Statistics
Institute. Size is measured in terms of employees. Micro: [0,9], small: [10,49], medium and large: >50.
Non-micro: >9
account for more than the 95 % of firms in Spain,4 they are the key drivers of the
low bankruptcy rate of Spanish companies. They are also very important in terms
of economic activity: they accounted for 51 % of total employment and 28 % of
total value added before the economic crisis and they currently account for 39 and
25 %, respectively.5 Finally, although the available evidence is rather limited, Span-
ish micro firms seem to file for bankruptcy much less than some of their Euro-
pean counterparts: in 2006, the bankruptcy rates for self-employed and micro enter-
prises were 0.01 and 0.15 %, respectively, in Spain, while those in France were
11.1 and 23 %,6 and the bankruptcy rate for self-employed in the UK exceeded
16.2 %.7
Spanish micro firms also have other distinct characteristics. They hold, by far, the
largest proportion of mortgage loans over financial debt, as shown in Fig. 2. Filing
for bankruptcy is especially unattractive for them because a significant proportion
of the bankruptcy costs are fixed (Van Hemmen 2011).8 Personal bankruptcy may
apply to many of those firms regardless of their legal form, because the distinction
between limited and unlimited liability may be blurred for them, partly because lenders
4 Source: Central Business Register, National Statistics Institute of Spain.
5 Sources: Observatory of European SMEs (2003) and authors’ computations from Eurostat.
6 Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Altares (2011), Eurostat.
7 Figures on bankruptcy filings for self-employed are only available for England and Wales, so the computed
bankruptcy rate (176) is a lower bound of that for the UK.
8 Compensation of the insolvency administrators, lawyers’ fees, etc.
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Fig. 2 % Mortgage loans over bank debt by business size in Spain. Source: Authors’ elaboration with data
from the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance Sheet Data Office, Banco de España
require personal guarantees or security in the form of a mortgage on the owner’s home
(Berkowitz and White 2004).
Consistent with those stylized facts, our hypothesis on the low business bankruptcy
rates in Spain is the following. Filing for bankruptcy in Spain is very costly for both
small firms and their creditors. Due to this, the capital structure of micro firms is
biased towards mortgage loans (i.e., loans secured on land and buildings). Having this
capital structure allows them to avoid bankruptcy by carrying out debt enforcement
via mortgage foreclosures,9 which are cheaper procedures than bankruptcy, in case of
financial distress.
In order to test this hypothesis the optimal identification strategy would be to analyse
the impact of substantial changes in the Spanish bankruptcy law in both bankruptcy
rates and firms’ capital structure. The current bankruptcy code entered into force
in 2004 after a major legislative reform. But it seems that the de facto insolvency
framework barely changed because the performance of bankruptcy proceedings did
not seem to substantially improve (Gutiérrez 2005; Van Hemmen 2004), bankruptcy
rates did not increase after the introduction of the new code and it seems that firms’
capital and asset structures have not changed either (Celentani et al. 2010).
By contrast, our identification strategy relies on cross-country comparisons. Specif-
ically, we compare the observed choices (choice of capital structure, choice between
bankruptcy and mortgage) of Spanish firms with those of firms from countries where
their bankruptcy systems are more efficient and their laws do not incentivise them to
bias their capital structure towards mortgage loans. France and the UK are chosen as
the comparison group because their bankruptcy rates are much higher than the Spanish
ones and because of the specific features of their insolvency frameworks.10
9 Mortgage creditors can also enforce their claims inside a bankruptcy procedure, as any other creditors.
Throughout this paper we will use the term “mortgage foreclosure” when we mean debt enforcement outside
bankruptcy.
10 We must exclude other potentially interesting examples (e.g. Germany and the US) due data constraints.
Our data come from the office of the Registrar of Companies of each country, but only large firms have the
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Our findings corroborate the proposed hypothesis. First, there is a positive and
strong correlation between the ex-ante probability of default and the ratio of tangible
fixed assets (the assets that can be pledged as mortgage collateral) to financial debt
in the case of Spanish micro firms, suggesting that firms with risky business models
bias their capital structure towards mortgage loans to avoid filing for bankruptcy in
the event of default. Second, a higher proportion of tangible fixed assets over financial
debt significantly decrease the probability of being in bankruptcy among Spanish
micro firms in financial distress. By contrast, these two relations do not hold either for
Spanish larger businesses or for firms from the other two countries.
Finally, we must stress the importance of the research question. The model of
García-Posada (2013) predicts that, in the context of the Spanish insolvency frame-
work, there is a positive relation between bankruptcy rates and welfare. The intuition
is that low bankruptcy rates and low welfare are the outcome of an institutional design
characterised by the low efficiency and low creditor protection of the bankruptcy sys-
tem relative to those of an alternative insolvency institution, the mortgage system.
In that context, firms and their creditors avoid filing for bankruptcy by heavily rely-
ing on mortgage collateral, which can be repossessed and liquidated in the event of
default. The problem is that the mortgage system is not well suited for some firms,
which need to bias their asset structure to have enough collateral, with the ensuing
productive inefficiencies. Those firms would be better off if they had access to a
bankruptcy system that worked relatively well. In other words, as the bankruptcy and
mortgage systems are imperfect substitutes, the equilibrium in which only mortgage
is widely used (reflected in low bankruptcy rates) is Pareto dominated by the equilib-
rium in which agents can choose between the two insolvency institutions (reflected
in higher bankruptcy rates). His analysis also predicts that bankruptcy will be unfea-
sible for the smallest firms in the economy as long as some of the bankruptcy costs
are fixed. As some of those firms will have to overinvest in capital assets to sign
their contracts under mortgage, they will incur in productive inefficiencies. If the
absence of a well-functioning bankruptcy system for those firms also reduces their
growth opportunities—e.g., by hampering access to unsecured lending such as ven-
ture capital—then the current insolvency framework may help explain the firm size
distribution and the low aggregate productivity of the Spanish economy. This is con-
sistent with the evidence of Fabbri (2010) in Spain, who finds that lengthy bankruptcy
procedures decrease firm size and raise funding costs and with that of Ponticelli (2012)
in Brazil, who shows that congestion in bankruptcy courts substantially reduces firm-
level investment and productivity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
overview and discusses the paper’s main contributions. Section 3 discusses some key
features of the insolvency framework of Spain, France and the UK Sect. 4 focuses
on data sources and sample selection criteria. Section 5 explains the empirical testing
of the hypothesis. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides a description of the
Footnote 10 continued
legal obligation to register their annual accounts in Germany. In the case of the US, the available data is at
plant-level, while the decision to file for bankruptcy is made at firm-level.
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main legal concepts used in this paper and Appendix B contains some robustness
analyses.
2 Contribution and related literature
This paper is mainly related to the works of Morrison (2008, 2009), and Celentani
et al. (2010, 2012). Morrison (2008, 2009) studied why US small distressed firms—
defined as those with 500 or fewer employees—rarely file for bankruptcy. He argued
that there are cheaper procedures for these firms, such as assignments for the benefit
of creditors,11 bulk sales,12 foreclosures and private workouts. Their implementation,
however, require that neither the debtor firm nor the creditors’ file for bankruptcy. They
also face, unlike the bankruptcy system, major coordination and asymmetric informa-
tion problems that may hamper their use. Thus he identified the conditions under which
these problems are not very important so those procedures can be implemented: small
firms, with simple capital structures (i.e., low number of secured creditors) and with
close and trustworthy relationships with their creditors are likely to avoid filing for
bankruptcy. This paper applies a similar reasoning to the Spanish, British and French
case: wherever there are cheaper alternatives to bankruptcy, the latter will only be used
when parties don’t reach an agreement, becoming the residual option.
Celentani et al. (2010, 2012) were the first that studied the low bankruptcy rates
in Spain. They proposed an explanation that was not immediately contradicted by a
number of aggregate stylized facts. Specifically, they used the theoretical prediction
of Ayotte and Yun (2009), according to which low creditor protection and low judicial
ability imply low bankruptcy rates, to conjecture a wide set of activities (leverage
reduction, lenders’ screening and monitoring, choice of projects that trade off return
for lower risk and/or lower liquidation costs, use of mortgage collateral) in which
firms and their creditors could engage to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. This
paper focuses on one of their ideas, the use of mortgage foreclosures as an alternative
to formal bankruptcy procedures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that addresses the research question with firm-level data, which allows testing the
hypothesis by means of econometric analyses.
3 Insolvency frameworks
In this section we will focus on the features of the insolvency frameworks of Spain,
France and the UK related to our hypothesis, namely, the choice between bankruptcy
procedures and mortgage foreclosures and the choice of firms’ capital and asset struc-
tures. We will examine the incentives to file for bankruptcy of both the debtor firm and
its creditors, as alternative procedures such as mortgage foreclosures can only take
11 In an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the business assigns its assets to a trustee, who auctions
them off and distributes the proceeds to creditors.
12 In a bulk sale the debtor sells most or all of its business to a third party and distributes the proceeds to
creditors.
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place if both parties refrain from filing. For a more thorough analysis of the insolvency
frameworks see Celentani et al. (2010, 2012) and Davydenko and Franks (2008).
3.1 Spain
The Spanish bankruptcy system (Ley Concursal) only had, until very recently, an
insolvency procedure, the concurso de acreedores (bankruptcy13), both for firms and
individual debtors.14 Both the debtor and the creditors may initiate the proceedings.
Bankruptcy procedures are costly and lengthy, rendering them unappealing for
both distressed firms and their creditors. The direct costs of bankruptcy are high,
as those procedures are complex, uncertain, involve many creditors and face high
information asymmetries between the company and its lenders, requiring a great deal
of intervention by the court, insolvency administrators, lawyers, etc. According to the
Doing Business estimates, those costs would account for a 15 % of the firm’s total
assets. As a substantial part of those costs are fixed (Van Hemmen 2008), bankruptcy
procedures are especially costly in the case of small firms. The median duration of a
bankruptcy process ranged between 20 and 23 months15 (Van Hemmen 2008) before
the economic crisis. The modest increase in the number of bankruptcy filings due
to the crisis has congested the courts and lead to a dramatic increase in the length
of the procedures, which ranged between 28 and 42 months in 2011 (Van Hemmen
2012).16 Finally, as the law does not provide any debt discharge for individuals17
and homestead exemptions are very low, individual debtors—including self-employed
people and owners of small limited-liability firms that pledge personal guarantees to
obtain funding for their businesses—have no incentives to file for bankruptcy.
Mortgage foreclosures are much cheaper and quicker than bankruptcy procedures,
as they are quite standardised processes with a low degree of uncertainty about its
final outcome. According to European Mortgage Federation (2007), their total costs
are between the 5 and 15 % of the price obtained in the auction of the collateral (the per-
centage decreases as the sale price increases), and their usual length is 7–9 months.18
Hence, mortgage foreclosures are an attractive alternative to bankruptcy, especially
in the case of small firms. But, to make possible that a firm and their creditors use
the mortgage system in case of financial distress, the firm’s capital structure must
be biased towards mortgage loans and their asset structure must be biased towards
assets—such as land and buildings—that can be pledged as mortgage collateral.
13 Read Appendix A for further clarifications on the translation of the legal terms of this paper.
14 In September 2013 the Spanish Parliament has approved some legal reforms that will create some sort
of special bankruptcy regime for self-employed individuals. See Appendix A, Sect. A.6, for details.
15 20 months for the so-called simplified procedure (concurso abreviado), 23 for the ordinary (concurso
ordinario). See Appendix A for details.
16 Similar estimations are provided by the General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del
Poder Judicial 2011).
17 In other words, all the present and future income of the debtor must be used to pay back pre-bankruptcy
debts.
18 Some of the legislative changes concerning the Spanish mortgage law (Ley Hipotecaria) introduced in
2013 may increase the length of mortgage foreclosures in the future (see Appendix A, Sect. 6 for details),
but not in the period of study of this research.
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3.2 France
The redressement judiciaire (judicial reorganization) and the liquidation judiciaire
(judicial liquidation) are the main insolvency procedures for corporations in France.
As for personal bankruptcy, which may apply to both consumer and entrepreneurs,
there are two different procedures: the plan de redressement (reorganization plan)
and the procedure de rétablissement personnel (procedure of personal recovery). The
debtor, creditors, the public prosecutor and the court itself may initiate the proceedings.
Bankruptcy procedures are relatively cost-effective. According to the Doing Busi-
ness estimates, the direct costs would account for a 9 % of the firm’s total assets and
the average duration in 2007 was 14.2 months (Ministère de la Justice 2010). More-
over, self-employed and small business owners may have incentives to file for personal
bankruptcy as they may benefit from debt discharge in some circumstances.19
Another characteristic of the bankruptcy system is the high dilution that mortgage
credit suffers inside bankruptcy (Davydenko and Franks 2008). First, there is an auto-
matic stay for secured creditors until the end of the procedure. Second, bankruptcy
courts tend to sell the assets below their potential market prices, as they are not obliged
to sell the assets to the highest bidder, but they can sell the whole company to a lower
bidder that commits to preserve employment, as creditors’ approval is not required for
the sale of their collateral. Third, the state places its own claims and those of employees
first in priority when the collateral is sold.
In that context, mortgage creditors would like to enforce their claims outside bank-
ruptcy via mortgage foreclosures, but they are quite slow and expensive. According to
European Mortgage Federation (2007), their total costs are between the 10 and 12 %
of the price of allocation and their usual length is between 15 and 25 months. As a
result, the response of creditors is to rely more on some types of collateral—such as
personal guarantees and accounts receivable—that can be realised directly by secured
creditors and are not diluted by preferential creditors. These collateral types are used
more often than mortgage collateral (Davydenko and Franks 2008).
Hence, mortgage foreclosures are not an attractive alternative to bankruptcy and
mortgage collateral is not a very appealing guarantee. As a consequence, we expect
mortgage loans to have little weight in the firms’ capital structure and the assets that
can be pledged as mortgage collateral—such as land and buildings—to account for a
low proportion of their total assets.
3.3 UK
Although various corporate insolvency procedures coexist in the UK, administration
is the most important one since the entry into force of the Enterprise Act 200220 and
19 There is immediate debt discharge in the procedure de retablissement personnel. In the plan de redresse-
ment, although it mainly consists of a reorganisation plan, the judge may enforce a debt-restructuring
schedule and he can also partly reduce the debts. For more details see Blazy et al. (2011).
20 The main insolvency procedure before the Enterprise Act 2002, administrative receivership, is normally
characterised as a foreclosure, since it was a procedure for the enforcement of a security interest (a floating
charge) covering all or nearly all the assets of the debtor firm, while administration is normally classified
as a bankruptcy procedure (Djankov et al. 2008).
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bankruptcy is the most common procedure used by individuals.21 Both the debtor and
the creditors may initiate the proceedings.
Bankruptcy procedures are quite cheap and fast. According to the Doing Business
estimates, the direct costs would account for a 6 % of the firm’s total assets and their
average duration would be <1 year (Armour and Hsu 2012; Frisby 2006). In the case of
personal bankruptcy, debt discharge is allowed one year after the end of the procedure,
providing incentives to small firms and self-employed to file for bankruptcy.
Another characteristic of the UK insolvency framework is the existence of floating
charges. A floating charge is a security interest over a fund of a firm’s changing assets
that “floats” until it “crystallises” (converts) into a fixed charge,22 at which point the
charge attaches to specific assets. The crystallisation can be triggered by a number
of events, being one of them the borrower’s default. There are two main differences
between a floating charge and other security interests such as a mortgage. First, because
the security “floats”, the firm remains free to purchase and sell its assets. Second, the
assets of the entire business can be pledged as collateral. Those characteristics grant
high flexibility to the firm’s asset structure and permit it not to be biased through
certain types of assets such as land and buildings.
Mortgage foreclosures are neither significantly faster nor cheaper than bankruptcy
procedures. According to European Mortgage Federation (2007) their usual length is
between 8 and 12 months and their total costs are around 5 %. These facts, together
with the existence of floating charges, lead us to expect a low incidence of foreclosures
and a relatively low weight of mortgage loans (land and buildings) in firms’ capital
(asset) structures.
Table 2 summarises the main characteristics of the insolvency frameworks of Spain,
France and the UK.
4 Data
The firm-level data come from the OECD-Orbis database, which is the result of the
treatment of the commercial database Orbis by the OECD (Ribeiro et al. 2010; Ragous-
sis and Gonnard 2011). Orbis contains financial information on both private and pub-
licly held companies around the world although coverage, especially of small firms,
greatly varies across countries. Orbis also provides other non-financial information,
such as year of incorporation, industry, legal form and status. Status is a variable that
tells the legal and economic condition of the firm: for instance, if the company is active
or it has ceased its operations and if it is undergoing a bankruptcy procedure or not.
The data have, however, some important limitations. First, if a business shut down
without filing for bankruptcy, the records do not indicate which alternative procedure
the firm used.23 Second, the status is only observed at the moment in which the data
are extracted from the database, i.e., no historical records are kept. Since the data
21 In the UK the term “bankruptcy” only applies to individuals, while insolvency is the term that applies
to companies.
22 See Appendix A for an explanation of floating and fixed charges.
23 But it does indicate mergers, so we can exclude them from the analysis.
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Table 2 Insolvency frameworks in Spain, France and the UK
Bankruptcy Mortgage
Panel A: Spain
Duration (months) 20–23 7–9
Cost (% assets) 15 % 5–15 %
Discharge for individual debtors? No No
Panel B: France
Duration (months) 14.2 15–25
Cost (% assets) 9 % 10–12 %
Discharge for individual debtors? Yes No
Other characteristics High dilution of mortgage
credit inside bankruptcy
Panel C: UK
Duration (months) <12 8–12
Cost (% assets) 6 % 5 %
Discharge for individual debtors? Yes No
Other characteristics Floating charge
Sources: European Mortgage Federation (2007), Van Hemmen (2008), Ministère de la Justice (2010),
Kindly check Armour and Hsu (2012) given in Table footnote not present in reference list, Frisby (2006),
Doing Business Database
from Orbis were extracted in 2010 (December 31, 2010), we have the status of each
company at that time. Finally, as Orbis is a commercial database, our sample may
not be representative of the whole population. We address this potential criticism in
Appendix B.
Regarding the sample selection, we use data on firms from three countries: Spain,
France and the UK We only keep their financial data for 2008 because of two reasons.
First, the main variable in all our analyses will be constructed using the information on
status, which is only available for 2010. This makes panel data an unfeasible structure
for the sample, since the variation in the main variable will happen across sections,
but not across time. Second, because of the time lag in the submission of financial
statements by firms, the Orbis database is characterised by a typical time lag of 2
years (Ribeiro et al. 2010), which implies that coverage (in number of companies
with complete records) for 2009 and 2010 is very poor, leaving 2008 as the best
choice. While this time gap could be problematic, it alleviates a simultaneity bias that
may arise if the bankruptcy process or the alternative insolvency procedure affects
the company’s financials (e.g. a foreclosure on some of the firm assets or a debt
haircut), as our regressors will be lagged twice. We also apply some filters to clean the
data. We exclude state-owned companies, non-profit organisations and membership
organisations. To avoid double-counting of information we eliminate all consolidated
accounts for which unconsolidated information exists. Finally, we remove inconsistent
observations24 and extreme values. Our final sample has more than 560,000 firm-level
observations.
24 For instance, those that violate basic accounting rules.
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For the empirical analyses of this paper it is crucial to distinguish between finan-
cially distressed firms and non-distressed ones. While it is probably safe to assume that
all firms under bankruptcy proceedings are distressed (rarely will a healthy business
file a bankruptcy petition), for the rest of observations we proxy distressed businesses
as those whose interest coverage ratio (EBITDA25 over interest expenses) is lower
than 1.
We then construct several variables. Bankruptcy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the firm was bankrupt when the data were extracted (2010). To measure the probability
of default we use the Altman’s Z-Score (Altman 2000).26 As the Orbis database does
not contain specific information on mortgage loans, we need to construct a proxy
for the proportion of those loans on total debt. The proposed proxy is “Tangibility”,
which is computed as the ratio between tangible fixed assets (land, buildings, plant
and machinery)27 to financial debt, in percentage terms. Since tangible fixed assets
are the only assets that can be used as mortgage collateral in Spain, we relate those
assets with the debts they may secure. For robustness, we have carried out all this
paper’s analyses with an alternative proxy that includes trade credit, namely the ratio
between tangible fixed assets to total debt, reaching very similar conclusions, which
is not surprising given the high correlation between the two proxies.28
As controls, we use a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has limited liability, the
firm’s age, the firm’s size—computed as the number of employees29—and indus-
try dummies. According to Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994),
firm’s age captures the public reputation of the firm, since they find a negative rela-
tionship between firms’ age and interest rate premium charged by banks. Davydenko
and Franks (2008) interpret age as a proxy for information asymmetries between a
firm and its lenders, since they find negative impact of age on the probability of filing
for bankruptcy (vis-à-vis using out-court procedures). Age may also capture coordi-
nation costs, as older firms are more likely to maintain multiple bank relationships
(Hernández-Cánovas and Köeter-Kant 2008). With respect to firm’s size, small firms
may file less for bankruptcy if a substantial proportion of the bankruptcy costs are
fixed (Morrison 2008) or if personal insolvency laws are very severe, although the
relationship between size and bankruptcy need not be linear because very large firms
25 Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
26 The Z-Score has several versions depending on the type of firms. The one used in this paper is for
non-listed firms that do not necessarily belong to the manufacturing sector. The exact formula is: Z =
6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 where X1 = (Current Assets−Current Liabilities)/Total Assets; X2 =
Retained Earnings/Total Assets; X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets; X4 = Book Value
of Equity/Total Liabilities.
27 Plant and machinery can also be mortgage collateral as long as they are inside the buildings.
28 0.82 in the case of non-distressed firms, 0.89 for distressed ones. All estimations are available upon
request.
29 Since the number of employees were missing for a non-negligible part of the sample, values have been
imputed using Poisson regressions for each country, where the predictor variables were a proprietary variable
of Orbis that has four size categories according to several size measures (revenue, total assets, employees
and whether the firm is listed) and industry dummies. The paper’s results—available upon request—do not
qualitatively change when total assets or turnover are used as alternative measures.
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may prefer to avoid the adverse publicity of a bankruptcy filing. To correct for right
skewness we will take logs of age and size in our statistical analyses.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for the non-distressed firms
differentiating by country and size class (micro and non-micro). Spanish firms are
smaller and younger than their French and UK counterparts in both groups. More
remarkably, their mean levels of Tangibility are substantially higher than those of UK
and France in the case of micro firms (Panel A), while only slightly higher in the case
of larger firms (Panel B). We obtain similar results in the case of distressed firms (Table
4). Tangibility is also higher in Spain than in the other countries when we disaggregate
by industry (Table 5). This evidence supports our hypothesis that Spanish firms have
their capital structure biased towards mortgage collateral as a response to the particular
insolvency framework they face, as in countries where the bankruptcy system is more
effective vis-à-vis mortgage and the law grants less protection to mortgage creditors
relative to other secured creditors (France, UK) firms have less tangible fixed assets
relative to their financial debt.
5 Empirical analyses
Our hypothesis on the low business bankruptcy rates in Spain leads to two testable
hypotheses regarding firms’ behaviour ex-ante (i.e., prior default) and ex-post. From
the ex-ante perspective, as filing for bankruptcy is very costly, small firms with risky
business models will bias their capital structure towards mortgage loans to avoid filing
for bankruptcy in the event of default. From the ex-post perspective, holding mortgage
debt will reduce the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a small financially distressed
firm. These two implications should not occur in the case of either Spanish larger
businesses or firms from the other two countries.
5.1 Ex-ante perspective: capital structure and business risk
We run within-country regressions to assess the sign and size of the relationship
between the proxy for the percentage of mortgage debt, Tangibility, and the ex-ante
probability of default, as measured by the Altman’s Z-score.30 We only use, from
our sample, non-distressed firms, i.e., those whose interest coverage ratio is equal
or greater than 1, which are not under bankruptcy procedures and are active in the
market. We split the data into two sub-samples, one for micro firms and another one
for non-micro firms.
Five different specifications, where Age, Size (both in logs), the limited liability
dummy and 488 industry dummies31 are used as controls, are estimated through Tobit
regressions. The results are displayed in Tables 6 (micro firms) and 7 (non-micro).
The coefficient on the Z-score is negative for Spanish micro firms. As a lower Z-
score represents a higher probability of default, the negative sign means that riskier
30 Although the Altman Z-Score was originally developed for bankruptcy prediction, it is now considered
a good measure of other types of financial distress (Grice and Ingram 2001).
31 Industry is defined at 4 digits of disaggregation. NACE Rev. 1.1. classification.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics (non-distressed firms)
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: micro firms
Spain
Tangibility 143,491 148.2 148.0 0 797.0
Limited liability 143,491 1.00 0.01 0 1
Age 143,413 12.9 7.2 3 111
Size 143,491 3.9 2.4 1 9
Z-Score 143,491 2.1 3.1 −12 16.5
France
Tangibility 145,361 114.2 116.6 0 620.2
Limited liability 145,361 1.00 0.06 0 1
Age 145,342 12.1 9.7 3 177
Size 145,361 3.3 2.3 1 9
Z-Score 145,361 1.2 3.6 −13 16.8
UK
Tangibility 2,668 104.7 142.3 0 909.1
Limited liability 2,668 1.00 0.03 0 1
Age 2,668 16.6 14.8 3 149
Size 2,668 4.3 2.5 1 9
Z-Score 2,668 2.9 5.6 −23 26.9
Panel D: non-micro firms
Spain
Tangibility 64,750 157.0 149.8 0 797.0
Limited liability 64,750 1.00 0.02 0 1
Age 64,705 18.2 10.3 2 169
Size 64,750 48.0 413.0 10 63.629
Z-Score 64,750 2.5 2.5 −12 16.3
France
Tangibility 39,293 150.1 132.1 0 620.8
Limited liability 39,293 0.99 0.09 0 1
Age 39,293 23.5 16.4 3 211
Size 39,293 61.5 499.6 10 72,199
Z-Score 39,293 2.6 2.4 −13 15.8
UK
Tangibility 16,923 147.3 169.4 0 931.3
Limited liability 16,923 1.00 0.05 0 1
Age 16,923 26.3 20.4 3 155
Size 16,923 348.8 2116.5 10 105,664
Z-Score 16,923 2.6 3.0 −22 21.6
Tangibility is the ratio between tangible fixed assets to financial debt, in %. Limited liability is a dummy
that equals 1 if the firm is a limited-liability company and 0 otherwise. Age is number of years since
registration. Size is the number of employees. Z-Score is the Altman’s Z-Score for non-listed firms that do
not necessarily belong to the manufacturing sector (Altman 2000)
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics (distressed firms)
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: micro firms
Spain
Bankruptcy 31,009 0.03 0.2 0 1
Tangibility 31,009 94.3 101.1 0 540.2
Limited liability 31,009 1.00 0.01 0 1
Age 30,987 12.2 7.7 3 111
Size 31,009 3.5 2.3 1 9
Z-Score 31,009 −1.4 5.5 −22.4 20.0
France
Bankruptcy 34,677 0.13 0.3 0 1
Tangibility 34,677 66.3 74.1 0 394.7
Limited liability 34,677 1.00 0.07 0 1
Age 34,676 12.6 10.9 2 197
Size 34,677 3.9 2.2 1 9
Z-Score 34,677 −2.5 5.1 −22.0 17.9
UK
Bankruptcy 1,710 0.12 0.3 0 1
Tangibility 1,710 70.8 89.8 0 504.4
Limited liability 1,710 1.00 0.02 0 1
Age 1,710 14.4 13.0 3 106
Size 1,710 6.1 2.4 1 9
Z-Score 1,710 −3.3 7.6 −33.9 19.0
Panel B: non-micro firms
Spain
Bankruptcy 8,583 0.14 0.3 0 1
Tangibility 8,583 94.7 101.5 0 540.0
Limited liability 8,583 1.00 0.03 0 1
Age 8,577 17.2 11.2 3 169
Size 8,583 38.7 110.6 10 3,538
Z-Score 8,583 −0.9 4.6 −22.4 17.8
France
Bankruptcy 12,783 0.22 0.4 0 1
Tangibility 12,783 80.8 65.7 0 394.1
Limited liability 12,783 0.98 0.14 0 1
Age 12,783 19.4 16.0 3 208
Size 12,783 40.1 181.4 10 15.521
Z-Score 12,783 −1.2 4.5 −22.0 18.1
UK
Bankruptcy 7,051 0.15 0.4 0 1
Tangibility 7,051 78.6 91.6 0 518.5
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Table 4 continued
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Limited liability 7,051 1.00 0.06 0 1
Age 7,051 19.5 19.2 3 141
Size 7,051 192.6 1022.8 10 40,855
Z-Score 7,051 −2.3 6.5 −34.1 13.9
Bankruptcy is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is bankrupt and 0 otherwise. Tangibility is the ratio between
tangible fixed assets to financial debt, in %. Limited liability is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is a
limited-liability company and 0 otherwise. Age is number of years since registration. Size is the number
of employees. Z-Score is the Altman’s Z-Score for non-listed firms that do not necessarily belong to the
manufacturing sector (Altman 2000)
firms rely more on mortgage collateral, suggesting that those firms bias their capital
structure towards mortgage loans to avoid filing for bankruptcy if they experienced
financial distress. The impact is also economically significant: a unit-decrease in the
Z-score would increase Tangibility between two or three percentage points, depending
on the specification. By contrast, the coefficient on the Z-score is positive in the rest of
cases: firms with risky business models usually have little collateral to pledge, as their
main assets are know-how, intellectual property -often unregistered- and firm-specific
human capital and machinery.32
5.2 Ex-post perspective: capital structure and bankruptcy risk
A first descriptive check can be found in Table 8, where we split our sub-sample of
distressed firms into bankrupt and non-bankrupt for each size class and each country.
In the case of micro firms (panel A), distressed non-bankrupt firms have much higher
levels of Tangibility in Spain, while the opposite occurs in France and the UK. Non-
micro firms follow the same pattern, but the positive gap between bankrupt and non-
bankrupt in Spain is now smaller. As expected, non-bankrupt Spanish firms are smaller
and younger for both size classes, while those patterns are not so clear in France and
the UK.
A more thorough test consists of running within-country regressions to assess the
sign and size of the relationship between the proxy for the percentage of mortgage debt,
Tangibility, and the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a financially distressed firm
in each country, once other determinants are controlled for. We split the data into two
sub-samples, one for micro firms and another one for non-micro firms. In analytical
terms what we estimate is the following model:
P(Bankruptcyi/FinancialDistress)
= f (Tangibilityi , Control1i , . . . , ControlKi , ui )
32 An alternative explanation could be that firms with worse financials (lower Z-score) may not heavily
invest in long-term costly assets such as land and buildings relative to their debt levels because they suffer
from credit rationing. But, if that were the main reason, it would be very difficult to make sense of the case
of Spanish micro firms, where the opposite would occur.
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of
tangibility by industry
(distressed and non-distressed
firms)
Tangibility is the ratio between
tangible fixed assets to financial
debt, in %. Non-market services
are education, health, social
work and personal service
activities
Spain France UK
Panel A: distressed firms
Primary sector
Mean 129.6 106.7 114.5
St. Dev. (113.2) (86.5) (120.7)
N 1,151 717 180
Manufacturing and energy
Mean 109.6 85.0 70.2
St. Dev. (102.0) (85.4) (84.1)
N 5,083 5,299 1,110
Construction
Mean 90.9 76.4 78.7
St. Dev. (100.8) (74.6) (93.9)
N 5,604 4,684 660
Market services
Mean 88.9 65.5 75.7
St. Dev. (99.7) (76.0) (89.4)
N 25,854 33,415 5,927
Non-market services
Mean 117.2 77.0 86.2
St. Dev. (100.8) (77.4) (97.7)
N 1,900 3,345 884
Panel B: non-distressed firms
Primary sector
Mean 179.4 156.4 171.7
St. Dev. (156.5) (112.7) (190.3)
N 5,998 4,416 385
Manufacturing and energy
Mean 163.2 140.5 160.2
St. Dev. (149.2) (126.8) (175.1)
N 35,928 23,208 4,636
Construction
Mean 137.5 143.9 153.8
St. Dev. (141.3) (117.49) (174.3)
N 34,723 31,173 1,821
Market services
Mean 147.0 111.5 127.7
St. Dev. (148.8) (120.0) (158.0)
N 118,979 110,894 11,020
Non-market services
Mean 175.8 113.2 159.1
St. Dev. (154.0) (118.6) (175.3)
N 12,613 14,963 1,729
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Table 6 Determinants of tangibility (micro firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Z-Score −1.89***
(0.15)
−2.77***
(0.16)
−2.78***
(0.16)
−1.93***
(0.16)
−1.93***
(0.16)
Log (age) 31.92***
(0.72)
30.04***
(0.73)
28.51***
(0.74)
28.49***
(0.74)
Log (size) 10.86***
(0.57)
9.34***
(0.59)
9.34***
(0.59)
Limited liability −60.01
(61.27)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 143,491 143,413 143,413 143,413 143,413
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.38
France
Z-Score 5.11***
(0.09)
3.67***
(0.09)
3.64***
(0.09)
3.63***
(0.10)
3.63***
(0.10)
Log (age) 32.01***
(0.49)
30.70***
(0.51)
31.22***
(0.51)
31.25***
(0.51)
Log (size) 4.84***
(0.43)
4.17***
(0.44)
4.16***
(0.44)
Limited liability 20.27***
(4.71)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 145,361 145,342 145,342 145,342 145,342
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.22 0.47 0.48 0.94 0.94
UK
Z-Score 2.98***
(0.40)
2.95***
(0.40)
2.95***
(0.40)
3.84***
(0.43)
3.83***
(0.43)
Log (age) 33.86***
(3.96)
33.83***
(4.04)
30.25***
(4.28)
30.24***
(4.28)
Log (size) 0.17 (4.18) 7.87*
(4.19)
7.85*
(4.19)
Limited liability 22.68
(30.46)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 2,668 2,668 2,668 2,668 2,668
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.10 0.34 0.34 1.62 1.62
Dependent variable: tangibility. Estimator: Tobit. Industry is defined at 4 digits of disaggregation, leading
to 488 different dummies. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
Notice that we do not face a sample selection bias by only keeping the financially
distressed firms. Denoting Si as a selection indicator that equals 1 if the observation
is included in the sample and 0 otherwise, and icr the interest coverage ratio: Si = 1
if icri <1; Si = 0 if icri ≥1. As long as icr is uncorrelated with u, the unobserved
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Table 7 Determinants of tangibility (non-micro firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Z-Score 6.88***
(0.29)
6.16***
(0.29)
6.03***
(0.29)
8.28***
(0.29)
8.28***
(0.29)
Log (age) 15.89***
(1.05)
19.75***
(1.08)
17.95***
(1.12)
17.94***
(1.12)
Log (size) −11.44***
(0.77)
−11.80***
(0.78)
−11.81***
(0.78)
Limited liability −48.66
(47.28)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 64,750 64,705 64,532 64,532 64,532
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.54 0.54
France
Z-Score 8.66***
(0.28)
7.17***
(0.29)
7.27***
(0.29)
9.15***
(0.31)
9.15***
(0.31)
Log (age) 25.10***
(0.99)
23.17***
(1.03)
22.84***
(1.05)
22.85***
(1.05)
Log (Size) 6.29***
(0.87)
5.33***
(0.89)
5.32***
(0.89)
Limited liability −2.05
(8.35)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 39,293 39,293 38,818 38,818 38,818
Pttudo-R2 (%) 0.21 0.33 0.35 1.03 1.03
UK
Z-Score 9.72***
(0.45)
8.59***
(0.44)
8.67***
(0.45)
11.04***
(0.48)
11.04***
(0.48)
Log (age) 31.29***
(1.70)
30.92***
(1.71)
27.12***
(1.81)
27.16***
(1.81)
Log (size) 1.80*
(0.98)
0.22
(1.01)
0.27
(1.01)
Limited liability 27.21
(30.97)
Industry dummies (4 digits) No No No Yes Yes
N 16,923 16,923 16,923 16,923 16,923
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.23 0.37 0.37 1.02 1.02
Dependent variable: tangibility. Estimator: Tobit. Industry is defined at 4 digits of disaggregation, leading
to 488 different dummies. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
that factors that influence the decision to file for bankruptcy conditional on being in
financial distress, our sampling mechanism S(icr) will be exogenous. As our dependent
variable, BANKRUPTCY, is measured in 2010, while the interest coverage ratio icr
is measured in 2008, it seems safe to assume that BANKRUPTCY cannot have any
influence on icr, implying E[ui/S(icri )] = 0.
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In the case of micro firms, the first set of results is shown in Table 9, which displays
OLS regressions33 for the probability of bankruptcy. Five specifications, where Age,
Size (both in logs), the limited liability dummy and 14 dummies for industry34 are used
as controls, are shown for robustness. The table reveals that Tangibility is negatively
correlated with the probability of bankruptcy in Spain, while positivelycorrelated in
France and the UK.
However, we expect the estimates of Table 9 to be biased due to the endogeneity of
capital structure, as explained in the previous section. In other words, as firms’ capital
structure and the mechanism used to deal with insolvency are (ex-ante) jointly chosen
by firms, we face a simultaneity bias. Moreover, we expect Tangibility to be measured
with error because tangible fixed assets are valued at their acquisition (historical)
cost, which may differ from their market/collateral values. To solve these problems
we use as instrumental variable (IV) the average industry level of Tangibility—where
industry is defined at 4 digits of disaggregation, leading to 473 different classes—for
each size class (micro and non-micro).35 We expect this IV to be uncorrelated with any
unobserved determinant of the probability of bankruptcy of a single firm because no
firm chooses the asset and capital structure of its industry counterparts. Moreover, there
is a positive and sizeable correlation between the IV and the endogenous regressor—as
reflected by first-stage regressions36—since companies for the same industries tend
to have similar levels of tangibility.
The selected IV estimator is two-stage least squares (2SLS). We prefer not to
use IV probit as our main estimator because its consistency relies in some strong
assumptions such as conditional normality of the endogenous regressor (Wooldridge
2002) that do not seem to hold in our case. Despite the well-known caveats of the linear
probability model (heteroskedasticity, fitted probabilities out of [0, 1]), it requires
weaker assumptions and it usually provides good approximations of the marginal
effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009).37
The results for the estimation via 2SLS are displayed in Table 10. In the regres-
sions for the Spanish subsample, the marginal effects of Tangibility are negative and
highly significant, and they are substantially higher than those estimated without
instrumenting the regressor. They are also economically significant. A 1 % increase
in Tangibility—a small change, as its mean equals 85 % and its standard deviation
101 %—decreases the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a Spanish micro firm by
33 We use the linear probability model to avoid the separation problem we would face with non-linear
models such as logit or probit, as no Spanish firm with unlimited liability is bankrupt in our sample, i.e, we
have an empty cell for (Limited liability = 0, Bankruptcy = 1).
34 NACE Rev. 1.1. at the maximum aggregation level, e.g. D. Manufacturing.
35 The average level of tangibility is computed for each industry, regardless of the country. Although we
could have instead computed the average industry-country level of tangibility to increase the variability
of the IV, that variable may not be exogenous, since it may be influenced by the country’s institutional
framework.
36 Results available upon request.
37 Nevertheless, similar conclusions are reached when IV probit is used instead. Results available upon
request.
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Table 10 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro firms (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility −0.012***
(0.003)
–0.014***
(0.003)
−0.017***
(0.003)
−0.027***
(0.004)
−0.027***
(0.004)
Log (age) 0.909***
(0.160)
0.809***
(0.159)
0.807***
(0.170)
0.807***
(0.170)
Log (size) 1.362***
(0.124)
1.227***
(0.128)
1.227***
(0.128)
Limited liability 3.609***
(0.850)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 47,710 47,679 47,679 47,679 47,679
France
Tangibility 0.181***
(0.005)
0.176***
(0.006)
0.168***
(0.006)
0.071***
(0.007)
0.072***
(0.007)
Log (age) 1.867***
(0.205)
1.816***
(0.203)
2.070***
(0.196)
2.064***
(0.196)
Log (size) 1.960***
(0.221)
1.644***
(0.212)
1.646***
(0.212)
Limited liability 3.707***
(0.797)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 47,861 47,858 47,858 47,858 47,858
UK
Tangibility 0.233***
(0.068)
0.222***
(0.064)
0.142**
(0.064)
0.132*
(0.074)
0.132*
(0.074)
Log (age) −10.777***
(1.897)
−8.184***
(1.866)
−8.640***
(1.954)
−8.641***
(1.953)
Log (size) 16.376***
(1.753)
14.020***
(1.838)
14.016***
(1.839)
Limited liability 1.389
(3.827)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 3.6 % (Spain), 10.5 % (France), 31.6 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
around 0.03 %.38 As the unconditional probability39 of those firms is 3.6 %, the esti-
mated semielasticity is 0.83 %, which is a sizeable effect. By contrast, the marginal
38 One could argue that Tangibility is really a proxy for leverage and what we are capturing is a lower
probability of using bankruptcy for firms with lower leverage. To rule out that alternative explanation, we
have computed a leverage ratio, defined as financial debt over total assets. The correlation between the
leverage ratio and Tangibility is very low, especially in the case of Spanish micro firms: −0.07.
39 By unconditional probability we mean the sample proportion of bankrupt firms.
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effects of Tangibility are positive and significant both in France and the UK. This
latter result is consistent with the results of Davydenko and Franks (2008) on their
study of French, UK and German firms that defaulted on their bank debt. They find
that higher levels of collateral imply a significantly higher incidence of bankruptcies
and a somewhat higher probability of liquidation, suggesting that banks use formal
bankruptcy procedures to force a sale of collateral in those countries. This is not the
Spanish case, as there is an alternative insolvency procedure, a mortgage foreclosure,
through which collateral can be more efficiently liquidated.
With respect to the control variables, size has a positive impact in the probability
of bankruptcy in the three countries, suggesting that the fixed costs of bankruptcy
procedures deter very small firms from using them, as argued by Morrison (2008). Age
has a negative effect in the case of UK, suggesting that lower information asymmetries
and higher reputation concerns incentivise older firms to avoid bankruptcy. By contrast,
it has a positive impact in the Spanish and French subsamples, probably capturing
the fact that, as older firms have more lenders, higher coordination costs reduce the
chances of non-bankruptcy procedures. Limited liability has a positive effect in three
countries—although not significant at 10 % in the UK40—consistent with the idea that,
when the debtor may lose part of its personal wealth, she has fewer incentives to file
for bankruptcy, even when some partial discharge—as in France and in the UK—may
be granted.
The case of non-micro firms is analysed in Tables 11 and 12. As a benchmark, Table
11 shows the (biased) OLS estimates for the three countries, which reveals the same
patterns as for micro firms: negative correlations in Spain and positive correlations in
France and the UK.
By contrast, the consistent IV estimates in Table 12 show that Tangibility has a
positive impact on the probability of bankruptcy of Spanish non-micro firms in 3 out
of the 4 specifications and it is not significant in specification (4), suggesting that it is
not a robust determinant. The case of French and UK larger firms is similar to the one
for micro: Tangibility has a robust positive impact in the probability of bankruptcy.
With respect to the control variables, size has a positive impact in the probability of
bankruptcy in Spain—as it was the case in the subsample of micro firms—but a negative
one in France and the UK. A possible interpretation is that the fixed costs of bankruptcy
proceedings deter small and very small firms from using them but, in the case of quite
large firms, other factors, such as the reputational loss of managers, make filing for
bankruptcy less appealing. As in the case of micro firms, age has a positive effect in
the Spanish subsample, but a negative one in the UK and no robust impact in France.
5.3 Robustness analysis of the ex-post perspective: private workouts and subsample
of firm exits
In our sample of distressed firms we have two types: bankrupt and non-bankrupt.
The former consists of firms under bankruptcy proceedings (i.e., still operating in the
40 Notice the large standard errors of the variable in the UK (Tables 8, 9), consequence of its little
variability: only 0.03 % of the micro UK firms in the sample had (un)limited liability.
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Table 11 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-micro firms (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility −0.022***
(0.003)
−0.025***
(0.003)
−0.024***
(0.003)
−0.026***
(0.003)
−0.026***
(0.003)
Log (age) 3.735***
(0.462)
3.446***
(0.464)
1.550***
(0.487)
1.561***
(0.487)
Log (size) 2.063***
(0.394)
2.521***
(0.400)
2.545***
(0.400)
Limited liability 15.141***
(3.053)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 11,477 11,462 11,462 11,462 11,462
R-squared (%) 0.45 0.98 1.21 4.53 4.55
France
Tangibility (0.040)*** 0.035***
(0.004)
0.034***
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.004)
Log (age) 3.418***
(0.353)
4.081***
(0.355)
1.185***
(0.353)
1.093***
(0.354)
Log (size) −4.508***
(0.294)
−3.662***
(0.291)
−3.582***
(0.291)
Limited liability 5.828***
(0.928)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339
R-squared (%) 0.74 1.23 2.18 14.45 14.54
UK
Tangibility 0.073***
(0.005)
0.080***
(0.005)
0.073***
(0.005)
0.070***
(0.005)
0.070***
(0.005)
Log(Age) −7.747***
(0.558)
−5.354***
(0.569)
−6.746***
(0.583)
−6.722***
(0.584)
Log (size) −6.580***
(0.323)
−5.958***
(0.329)
−5.923***
(0.329)
Limited liability 15.149***
(2.821)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829
R-squared (%) 2.52 4.30 7.49 12.76 12.79
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 12.8 % (Spain), 18.2 % (France), 29.5 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
market) and firms that have been liquidated after a bankruptcy procedure (i.e., they
have exited the market). The latter consists of companies that are still operating the
market under financial distress and companies that exited the market while they were
financially distressed. An alternative explanation for the negative impact of Tangibility
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Table 12 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-micro firms (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility 0.034***
(0.009)
0.025***
(0.009)
0.029***
(0.009)
0.001
(0.014)
0.001
(0.014)
Log (age) 2.807***
(0.488)
2.414***
(0.495)
1.164**
(0.526)
1.177**
(0.526)
Log (size) 2.510***
(0.410)
2.717***
(0.412)
2.740***
(0.413)
Limited liability 15,144***
(3.062)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 11,477 11,462 11,462 11,462 11,462
France
Tangibility 0.281***
(0.009)
0.284***
(0.010)
0.273***
(0.010)
0.142***
(0.013)
0.144***
(0.013)
Log (age) −0.677
(0.447)
0.088
(0.448)
−0.256
(0.397)
−0.370
(0.399)
Log (size) −3.991***
(0.344)
−3.642***
(0.305)
−3.565***
(0.306)
Limited liability 5.650***
(1.048)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339
UK
Tangibility 0.194***
(0.022)
0.205***
(0.022)
0.192***
(0.022)
0.131***
(0.025)
0.130***
(0.025)
Log (age) −9.382***
(0.655)
−7.167***
(0.690)
−7.775***
(0.728)
−7.743***
(0.730)
Log (size) −5.820***
(0.375)
−5.536***
(0.376)
−5.514***
(0.375)
Limited liability 11.957***
(3.279)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 12.8 % (Spain), 18.2 % (France), 29.5 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
on the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a Spanish micro firm is that firms with
high levels of tangible fixed assets relative to their levels of financial debt still have
assets they may pledge as mortgage collateral to get new loans or refinance their
current ones. In that case, they would avoid bankruptcy by surviving and staying in
the market thanks to a private workout, rather than exiting via a foreclosure.
We have two objections to this view: one is logical; the other one is based on
empirical evidence. First, in France, due the high dilution that most secured creditors
suffer inside bankruptcy (see Sect. 3.2), they may be willing to make debt concessions
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in a private workout to deter the debtor from filing for bankruptcy. By contrast, secured
creditors are unlikely to be held up by a debtor in Spain because, while there is an
automatic stay over the enforcement of some secured credit in bankruptcy, it is very
limited in time and uncertain in scope.41 In fact, the LLSV42 index (La Porta et al.
1998, updated by Djankov et al. (2007)), which measures the protection of secured
creditors in bankruptcy in a scale from 0 (lowest protection) to 4 (highest), assigns 3
to Spain while 0 to France. Hence it seems implausible to explain the large differences
in the bankruptcy rates of small firms in Spain and France in terms of the relative
incidence of private workouts. Since those rates are low in Spain and high in France,
workouts should be abundant in Spain and rare in France, while our reasoning suggests
the opposite.
Second, from the empirical point of view, we address this potential criticism by
keeping in the sample only those firms that exited the market. We construct a new
dependent variable, bankruptcy2, which takes the value 1 if the firm left the market after
a bankruptcy procedure and 0 otherwise. Our main results are the same: Tangibility
has a negative and significant impact on the probability of being bankrupt in the case
of Spanish micro firms (see Table 14).43 This effect is not present in Spanish larger
firms, since the correlation is not different from zero in our OLS estimates (see Table
15) and the causal impact is not robust to several specifications in our IV estimates
(see Table 16). By contrast, Tangibility has a positive impact on the probability of
leaving the market after bankruptcy in the case of French firms of both size classes,
while there is no effect in the case of British firms.
6 Conclusions
Spain had, before the current economic crisis, one of the world’s lowest business
bankruptcy rates, i.e., the number of business bankruptcy filings divided by the number
of business exits. Only the crisis has modestly increased the number of bankruptcies,
but the Spanish bankruptcy rate is still one of the lowest in the world. This fact is
driven by the behaviour of micro firms—the majority of Spanish firms—which rarely
file for bankruptcy when dealing with financial distress.
This paper presents and tests a hypothesis that attempts to explain this empirical
finding. According to this hypothesis, filing for bankruptcy in Spain is very costly for
both small firms and their creditors. Due to this, the capital structure of micro firms is
biased towards mortgage loans (i.e., loans secured on land and buildings). Having this
capital structure allows them to avoid bankruptcy by carrying out debt enforcement
via mortgage foreclosures, which are cheaper procedures than bankruptcy, in case of
financial distress.
41 The stay only involves secured credit over assets that are integrated in the debtor’s production process—
as considered by the court—and only for 1 year or until a restructuring plan that does not affect the rights
of secured creditors is approved, whichever occurs first. The law also allows the insolvency administrator
to pay secured creditors out of the company’s total assets during the stay.
42 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny.
43 Notice that in the regressions of Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 we do not include the variable Limited Liability,
as in some country-size class combinations it had no variability at all, as all firms had limited liability.
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Table 13 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy EXIT in micro firms (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spain
Tangibility −0.072***
(0.013)
−0.069***
(0.013)
−0.070***
(0.013)
−0.067***
(0.013)
Log (age) −13.669***
(2.153)
−13.953***
(2.140)
−16.027***
(2.116)
Log (size) 5.526***
(1.687)
2.976*
(1.710)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474
Pseudo-R2 (%) 2.07 4.56 5.25 12.99
France
Tangibility 0.040***
(0.012)
0.039***
(0.012)
0.036***
(0.012)
0.017
(0.012)
Log (age) −7.709***
(1.332)
−7.990***
(1.346)
−6.349***
(1.343)
Log (size) 2.600*
(1.393)
−0.756
(1.432)
Industry dummies (l digit) No No No Yes
N 2,220 2,220 2,220 2,220
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.52 2.10 2.26 10.62
UK
Tangibility 0.038***
(0.009)
0.033***
(0.008)
0.032***
(0.008)
0.033***
(0.009)
Log (age) 5.551***
(1.931)
5.562***
(1.927)
5.667***
(1.872)
Log (size) 3.904
(3.704)
3.058
(3.876)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 636 636 636 636
Peeudo-R2 (%) 1.99 3.17 3.39 9.15
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 61.8 % (Spain), 77.3 % (France), 89.8 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
To test this hypothesis our identification strategy relies on cross-country compar-
isons. Specifically, we compare the observed choices (choice of capital structure,
choice between bankruptcy and mortgage) of Spanish firms with those of firms from
countries where their bankruptcy systems are more efficient and their laws do not
incentivise them to bias their capital structure towards mortgage loans. France and
the UK are chosen as the comparison group because their bankruptcy rates are much
higher than the Spanish ones and because of the specific features of their insolvency
frameworks.
Our findings corroborate the proposed hypothesis. First, there is a positive and
strong correlation between the ex-ante probability of default and the ratio of tangible
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Table 14 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy EXIT in micro firms (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spain
Tangibility −0.119***
(0.034)
−0.112***
(0.035)
−0.125***
(0.036)
−0.146***
(0.036)
Log (age) −13.383***
(2.179)
−13.603***
(2.173)
−15.496***
(2.167)
Log (size) 5.750***
(1.693)
2.855*
(1.726)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474
France
Tangibility 0.283***
(0.049)
0.277***
(0.048)
0.280***
(0.051)
0.074
(0.047)
Log (age) −7.334***
(1.453)
−7.254***
(1.491)
−6.245***
(1.350)
Log (size) −0.707
(1.649)
−1.329
(1.507)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 2,220 2,220 2,220 2,220
UK
Tangibility 0.080***
(0.028)
0.077***
(0.028)
0.073**
(0.029)
0.068*
(0.035)
Log (age) 4.277**
(2.100)
4.378**
(2.092)
4.742**
(2.016)
Log (size) 2.520
(3.829)
2.098
(3.956)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 636 636 636 636
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 61.8 % (Spain), 77.3 % (France), 89.8 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
fixed assets (the assets that can be pledged as mortgage collateral) to financial debt
in the case of Spanish micro firms, suggesting that firms with risky business models
bias their capital structure towards mortgage loans to avoid filing for bankruptcy in
the event of default. Second, a higher proportion of tangible fixed assets over financial
debt significantly decrease the probability of being in bankruptcy among Spanish
micro firms in financial distress. By contrast, these two relations do not hold either for
Spanish larger businesses or for firms from the other two countries.
We must stress the importance of the research question. Bankruptcy procedures and
mortgage foreclosures are not perfect substitutes, and the underutilization of one of
them—reflected in low bankruptcy rates—may lead to efficiency losses and lower wel-
fare (García-Posada 2013). The reason is that the mortgage system is not well suited for
some firms, which need to bias their asset structure to have enough collateral, with the
ensuing productive inefficiencies. Those firms would be better off if they had access to
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Table 15 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy EXIT in non-micro firms (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spain
Tangibility 0.010
(0.025)
0.008
(0.024)
0.008
(0.024)
0.022
(0.020)
Log (age) 8.497***
(2.793)
8.575***
(2.814)
0.511
(2.902)
Log (size) −1.288
(2.703)
−0.384
(2.441)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 544 544 544 544
Pseudo R2 (%) 0.03 1.75 1.79 23.44
France
Tangibility 0.033***
(0.012)
0.036***
(0.012)
0.038***
(0.012)
0.023*
(0.012)
Log (age) −4.621***
(1.517)
−3.908**
(1.525)
−4.157***
(1.509)
Log (size) −6.722***
(1.697)
−5.648***
(1.694)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635
Pseudo R2 (%) 0.42 1.05 2.16 11.88
UK
Tangibility 0.032***
(0.005)
0.029***
(0.005)
0.030***
(0.005)
0.030***
(0.005)
Log (age) 6.429***
(0.942)
6.337***
(0.944)
5.202***
(0.973)
Log (size) 0.626
(0.743)
1.587**
(0.768)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
Pseudo R2 (%) 1.65 3.91 3.94 6.38
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 76.1 % (Spain), 76.3 % (France), 91.3 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
a bankruptcy system that worked relatively well. If the absence of a well-functioning
bankruptcy system for those firms also reduces their growth opportunities—e.g., by
hampering access to unsecured lending such as venture capital—then the current insol-
vency framework may help explain the firm size distribution and the low aggregate
productivity of the Spanish economy. This is consistent with the evidence of Fabbri
(2010) in Spain, who finds that lengthy bankruptcy procedures decrease firm size and
raise funding costs and with that of Ponticelli (2012) in Brazil, who shows that conges-
tion in bankruptcy courts substantially reduces firm-level investment and productivity.
This paper is a first step towards understanding how agents respond to the Spanish
insolvency framework and their implications for the real economy. Further work is
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Table 16 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy EXIT in non-micro firms (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spain
Tangibility −0.013
(0.058)
−0.021
(0.058)
−0.023
(0.058)
−0.090
(0.073)
Log (age) 8.574***
(2.802)
8.671***
(2.823)
0.344
(2.957)
Log (size) −1.534
(2.728)
−1.064
(2.492)
Industry dummies (l digit) No No No Yes
N 544 544 544 544
France
Tangibility 0.135***
(0.039)
0.143***
(0.040)
0.149***
(0.040)
0.055
(0.044)
Log (age) −5.409***
(1.573)
−4.644***
(1.580)
−4.302***
(1.516)
Log (size) −7.406***
(1.707)
−5.877***
(1.712)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635
UK
Tangibility 0.017
(0.018)
0.015
(0.018)
0.016
(0.018)
0.027
(0.018)
Log (age) 6.625***
(1.000)
6.542***
(1.008)
5.250***
(1.017)
Log (size) 0.535
(0.750)
1.561**
(0.771)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes
N 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 76.1 % (Spain), 76.3 % (France), 91.3 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
required in two directions. First, better data without the limitations of our sample,
especially regarding information on mortgage loans and the alternative procedures to
formal bankruptcy, could be collected. Second, the impact of the low efficiency of
the bankruptcy system vis-à-vis mortgage foreclosures on the performance of Spanish
firms should be empirically analyzed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:287–332 319
Appendix A: Legal terminology related to insolvency procedures, secured lending
and foreclosures under Spanish, English and French Law
A.1 Some preliminary clarifications
Legal terms are difficult to translate and do not have exact equivalents in different legal
systems. Basic concepts such as a “floating charge” (under English Law) have not a
direct translation into Spanish Law or French Law. Furthermore, Spanish or French
Law basic terms like hipoteca44 or hypothèque45 cannot be unambiguously translated
as “mortgage” in the British law. This appendix attempts to clarify the main concepts
used in this paper.
In all cases, we define “insolvency” as a situation in which the debtor is unable
to pay debts when they are due (cash-flow insolvency).46 This situation is known
in French law as cessation de paiements or faillite and in Spanish Law as quiebra
or bancarrota. In this appendix we focus on the analysis of insolvency once that
insolvency situation has been formally recognized. Previously, the debtor could have
tried to reach an out-of-court arrangement or private workout with its creditors by
which the creditors could accept less than the full amount (or in some cases, the full
amount, if it can be determined without the aid of any legal proceeding) they are
owed. If those arrangements fail or they are not even attempted, in Spain there is a
formal procedure to resolve an insolvency situation called concurso de acreedores. In
this paper the Spanish procedure is compared with the main procedures for corporate
insolvency in France (the redressement judiciare47 —a reorganisation procedure- and
the liquidation judiciare—a liquidation one48) and in the UK (administration and,
before 2003, administrative receivership).49
The Spanish bankruptcy system (Ley Concursal), which entered into force in
2004,50 applied to consumers and all types of firms, including both limited liabil-
ity companies and personally owned businesses with no limit to personal liability. In
September 2013 the Spanish Parliament approved some legal reforms in this regard
that are summarised in Appendix A.6. By contrast, there are specific procedures for
personal debtors both in France and the UK, which may be used by consumers, self-
employed individuals and owners of small firms that used personal guarantees to
44 In Spanish law, Article 1874 et seq of the Spanish Civil Code.
45 Articles 2393 et seq of the French Civil Code.
46 See Armour (2001) for a discussion on the different types of insolvency.
47 Law 2005-845 of July 26, 2005 “de sauvegarde des enterprises”.
48 A new procedure, the sauvegarde, was introduced in the latest reform of the bankruptcy code (Loi
de sauvegarde des entreprises), which came became effective in 2006. In addition, the parties have the
possibility to recur to a mandataire ad hoc, a process by which a court-appointed mediator assists in
nonbinding negotiations between a debtor and its creditors and to a réglement amiable, a judicially supervised
negotiation procedure in which the court may grant a stay against creditors.
49 Other (much less used) procedures are company voluntary arrangements—a reorganisation procedure—
compulsory liquidation and creditors’ voluntary liquidations.
50 The current Act has been modified three times, in March 2009, in October 2011 and in March 2014, in
order to solve various dysfunctional features in the initial design. For instance, formal workout negotiations
on the brink of bankruptcy filing have been facilitated.
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fund their businesses. France has two procedures, the plan de redressement and the
procedure de rétablissement personnel, while bankruptcy is the main insolvency pro-
cedure for individuals in the UK.51 It is necessary to remark that, in the UK, the term
“bankruptcy” only applies to individuals, while insolvency is the term that is used for
companies. Once taken into account this legal notice, we must note that the term bank-
ruptcy is used in this paper as a general term to denote formal insolvency procedures
in general (as used in American Standard English).
A.2 The equivalents in Spanish and French law of the UK insolvency proceedings
In the UK the main corporate insolvency procedure is called administration. Admin-
istrative receivership is not available from September 15, 2003 (although, of course,
we could still observe some few active cases) due to the adoption of the Enterprise
Act 2002. This case is discussed separately in Appendix A.4.
In the case of administration, an administrator is appointed and tries to reach a
better outcome for creditors than the one that could be achieved in a liquidation by
the debtor. The administration is requested before a judge by the insolvent company
or its creditors. If the judge deems that there is actually a situation of insolvency,
she will issue an administration order. It is very important to note that the holder of a
floating charge (a concept explained below) can appoint an administrator even without
court order. This administrator, however, will take care of the interests of all creditors
(and not only of the floating charge holder, unlike in the administrative receivership
procedure, see Appendix A.4).
As it was mentioned, the procedures closer to administration in French and Spanish
Law are, respectively, the redressement judiciare and the concurso de acreedores. In
all these cases there is judicial supervision of the procedures and the judge may appoint
an administrator for the insolvent company.52
A.3 The equivalents in Spanish and French law of the security interests in the UK law
A.3.1 Fixed charge
A fixed charge is defined over a determined (specific) movable or immovable property.
That is, the goods secured by a fixed charge must be clearly identifiable (in contrast
to the floating charge).
There are several types of fixed charges in English Law: mortgage over land and
buildings owned by the company, chattels mortgage and the charge against goodwill
and other intellectual property rights.
The first type of fixed charge is the one that is closest to what in Spanish law we
call hipoteca (which is a derecho real, a real right). It is regulated by articles 1874 et
51 Bankruptcy in Scotland is referred to as “sequestration”. Other personal insolvency procedures in Eng-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland are individual voluntary arrangements and debt relief orders, while another
one in Scotland is a “protected trust deed”.
52 This last circumstance only occurs in some specific cases in French law (in which the judge appoints
an administrateur judiciaire).
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seq of the Spanish Civil Code. The figure is close to the hypothèque in French law
(articles 2393 et seq of the French Civil Code). When there is a hipoteca or equivalent
figures, the ownership of the property remains to the buyer, but there is a charge over
that property right which disappears only when the loan has been repaid.
In the case of a chattels mortgage, the purchaser borrows funds for the purchase of
movable property (the chattel). The lender secures the loan with a mortgage over the
chattel. Legal ownership of the chattel is transferred to the purchaser at the time of
purchase, and the mortgage is removed once the loan has been repaid.
Potentially similar legal figures exist in Spanish law as the prenda53 (which is also
a derecho real) or the prenda sin desplazamiento and hipoteca mobiliaria governed by
the Ley de Hipoteca mobiliaria y prenda sin desplazamiento54 (thus out of the Spanish
Civil Code). Also potentially similar concepts exist in French Law, such as the gage
and the nantissement.55
As a result, hipoteca and mortgage are not directly interchangeable terms. Mortgage
in English law would identify a set of guarantees/securities on goods that could be,
roughly, the derechos reales (real rights) in continental law (Spanish and French Law,
in this paper). To avoid confusion, in this paper we identify what we call hipoteca in
Spain as mortgage over land and buildings (for brevity of exposition, just mortgage),
i.e., the first type of fixed charge discussed in this section.
A.3.2 Floating charge
Unlike the fixed charge (and its specificities), the floating charge has no strict equivalent
in Spanish or French law. The Civil Code in both countries requires that the secured
assets must be clearly identifiable. However, one would talk about some similarities
in the case of the prenda sin desplazamiento of the Spanish law.56
A floating charge is a security interest over a fund of changing assets57 of a firm
that “floats” until it “crystallises” (converts) into a fixed charge, at which point the
charge attaches to specific assets. The crystallisation can be triggered by a number of
events, being one of them the borrower’s default. In other words, the “floating charge”
is public and takes effect only when the company has failed to fulfil its obligations.
The main difference of the floating charge relative to other security interests such as
the fixed charge is that, because the security “floats”, the firm remains free to purchase
and sell assets. That is, the company remains in possession of the property and can
dispose of it in the normal course of business.
Unlike traditional collateral (derechos reales, as explained above) in Civil Law, the
floating charge covers not only present property but also the future property of the
53 Article 1863 et seq of the Spanish Civil Code.
54 Ley de hipoteca mobiliaria y prenda sin desplazamiento of December 16, 1954.
55 Articles 2333 et seq of the French Civil Code in the first case and 2355 and subsequent articles in the
second case.
56 In other Spanish-speaking or French-speaking legal systems and with evident influence of both continen-
tal and Anglo–Saxon Law, we could find legal figures such as the charge flottante (nantissement flottante)
of the Canadian Law and the prenda flotante that exists in some American legal systems.
57 For this reason, this legal figure may be “translated” in Spanish, not into Spanish law, as prenda rotativa.
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debtor (including future cash flows), while giving the debtor the right to dispose of
it. At the time of the crystallization, the “floating” charge is fixed and the beneficiary
may then exercise its rights over it.58 The floating charge is based on property that has
not already been specifically mortgaged or pledged.
In summary, compared to the flexibility of the floating charge (that is not related to
any good in particular until there is a crystallization as a result of the insolvency of the
debtor), the derechos reales (hipotecas, prendas, etc) in Spain are specific in nature.
The hipoteca, for example, is a security that gives its holder an immediate and direct
right over immovable property (mainly land and buildings) that can be exercised and
made effective against any other creditor. The prenda, meanwhile, is a security that
gives the holder a right over movable property.
A.4 Administrative receivership
Although, as noted before, this procedure is no longer available, there are still some
(few) active cases. In administrative receivership the holder of a floating charge on
the business, commonly one bank providing the bulk of finance to the company, could
appoint, with almost no other constraints, as soon as there was a default in the loan,
a receiver who would take over the entire company, assumed all the powers of the
company’s board of directors and would try to maximise recovery for the holder of
the floating charge59.
Naturally, this procedure did not prevent other creditors from exercising their right
to judicial oversight of the debtor’s insolvency. However, the floating charge holder had
the ability to veto other procedures, particularly the administration, if he appointed an
administrative receiver. As it was noted, after the disappearance of the administrative
receivership procedure (after September 15, 2003), judicial supervision (through the
process of administration) has become the standard way to proceed in UK Law.
A.5 Foreclosures, ejecuciones prendarias and related procedures
As it was introduced above, in Spain a creditor may secure a loan, among other
options, through a contract of prenda (over movable property), a hipoteca (on immov-
able assets) and other legal figures with characteristics of one or the other (hipoteca
mobiliaria, prenda sin desplazamiento). All these contracts are forms of real rights
(derechos reales) as the good is well identified (in all these cases we would be talking
about mortgages under UK Law, included under the category of fixed charges).
Both the prenda and the hipoteca must appear in a public document that facilitates
execution (if needed). Moreover, in the case of the hipoteca, the Spanish Law also
requires to be registered in the land registry. The creditor, in the event of loan default by
the debtor, may proceed to execute its right over the property (the acción hipotecaria
58 The crystallization has the effect of designating the property referred to and make it enforceable against
third parties.
59 This normally did not imply piecemeal liquidation of the assets, but the sale of the business to a new
entrepreneur.
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if there was a hipoteca contract and acción prendaria o pignoraticia if there was a
prenda). In Spain, in both cases the creditor may recourse to a judicial enforcement
(if performed by a judge) or an out of court enforcement (if performed by a notary).
The judicial enforcement60, both in the case of prendas and hipotecas, is regulated
by the Civil Procedural Law and establishes an auction with various guarantees to
the parties. The extrajudicial execution61, whether in either case, is done before a
notary also by auction (with citation of the debtor and the owner of the prenda where
applicable).
In the UK there is the so-called foreclosure, which could be defined as a debt
enforcement procedure aimed at recovering money owed to secured creditors (Djankov
et al. 2008). Derived from the above definition we must directly rule out a direct legal
equivalence between foreclosure and ejecución oracción hipotecaria. That is, we must
be very specific when using these terms. Therefore, we should “translate” ejecución de
un bien mueble pignorado (acción pignoraticia) as a foreclose on a pledged movable
asset under UK Law. Then, if the property is an immovable asset (e.g. a building,
a plant, the entrepreneur’s home), we could use the term “mortgage over land and
buildings” foreclosures in the case of an execution (acción hipotecaria in Spain). In
the main text we simplify the terminology and, for brevity of exposition, we use the
term mortgage foreclosure.
Alongside the Spanish case, in France we can find a droit réel de gage or nantisse-
ment on (tangible or intangible) movable property (the closest Spanish legal concept
is therefore the prenda) and a hypothèque on immovable property (the closest Spanish
figure, as it was discussed, would be the hipoteca). The French enforcement procedure
in the case of immovable property (saisie immobilière) differs with respect to that in
Spain, in the fact that judicial intervention is always needed. The judicial intervention
will take place either via a huissier (bailiff) or the enforcement judge directly (juge
d’exécution). Like in Spain, the execution of fixed charge/security over a movable
property (mise à exécution d’un gage ou d’un nantissement) can be either judicial or
extrajudicial.62
The specific rules governing the executions of fixed charges over immovable prop-
erty assets can be found in the Code des procédures civiles d’exécution63 and its
regulations. The execution (procédure of saisie immobilière) takes place after the
proper formal notifications to the debtor. In this procedure, as in Spain, there may be a
forced sale of the (immovable/land, buildings, etc) mortgaged property (vente forcée)
by auction (vente aux enchères) if it was not possible to do it in another way (vente
amiable).
60 Regulated in the article 681 et seq of the Civil Procedural Law of Spain. Law 1/2000, of January 7, de
Enjuiciamiento Civil.
61 Governed by article 1872 of the Spanish Civil Code in the case of movable property and article 222 et
seq of the Reglamento para la Ejecución de la Ley Hipotecaria (Decree of February 14, 1947) if the property
was secured by a hipoteca.
62 Articles 2347 and 2355 of the French Civil Code respectively.
63 The specific rules in these cases can be found in the Code des procédures civiles d’exécution (Title II,
Articles L.311-1 to L.322-14 and Title III) and its regulations.
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A.6 Recent developments in Spanish Law
Until very recently, in Spain the insolvency procedures available for self-employed
individuals and entrepreneurs (i.e., managers/owners of small firms) were governed by
the same rules than in the case of large businesses such as a limited liability companies.
In September 2013 the Spanish Parliament approved a law that will create some sort
of special bankruptcy regime for them.64 The law contemplates introducing some
limitation of the liability of the entrepreneur / self-employed individual through the
new figure of entrepreneur with limited liability (emprendedor de responsabilidad
limitada). This figure will allow that part of the assets of the entrepreneur will be
exempted in case of insolvency, namely EUR 300,000 invested in its primary residence.
The law also introduces a partial “fresh start”: the entrepreneur will be discharged
of her pre-bankruptcy debts as longs as she pays in full the preferential, secured and
privileged credit and at least a 25 % of the ordinary credit.65 Finally, the law establishes
a new insolvency procedure, the acuerdo extrajudicial de pagos, an extrajudicial debt
workout coordinated by a public mediator. If no agreement is reached between the
debtor and her creditors, a judicial bankruptcy procedure (concurso consecutivo) will
follow, but the negotiation attempt will increase the fresh start: no ordinary credit will
have to be reimbursed.
We must keep in mind that in Spain, as a general rule, it is not possible to apply a
principle of limited liability to the debtor (that is, legally release the debtor from its
debts, fully or partially, when it cannot pay). This is the so-called “principle of universal
liability” (article 1911 of the Civil Code)66 that states that the debtor responds with
all present and future assets to the fulfilment of its obligations.
The process of ejecución hipotecaria has also undergone some reforms very
recently (2013) which we should summarise here but do not affect the results of this
paper either. In parallel to the debate on the judgment “Aziz vs CatalunyaCaixa”,67 the
Law 1/2013 opens avenues to override clauses that impose “excessive” interest rates
to the debtor, through a reform of the Ley Hipotecaria.68 The reform also increases
from one to three the minimum number of payments that must be missed before the
foreclosure process can be started and it allows suspending for two years the evictions
of debtors when they are considered to be especially vulnerable. It also reformed the
auction process by amending the Civil Procedure Act. Specifically, it has lowered the
security required to tenderers.
64 Ley 14/2013, de 27 de septiembre, de apoyo a los emprendedores y su internacionalización.
65 Preferential credit (créditos contra la masa) comprises salaries for the last month of activity, the costs of
the procedure itself, including compensation for the insolvency administrators, plus the new debt incurred
by the firm in its activities after the insolvency declaration. Privileged credit (créditos con privilegio general)
mainly comprises other labour credits, tax debts and social security contributions.
66 Also articles 605 to 607 of the Civil Procedural Law.
67 Judgment in Case C-415/11of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
68 Article 3 of Law 1/2013, of May 14, de medidas para reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios,
reestructuración de deuda y alquiler social.
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Table 17 Number of micro
firms and % over the total
number of distressed firms
Spain France UK
Unweighted sample 47,710 47,861 2,387
80.6 % 74.6 % 21.3 %
Weighted sample 44,189 42,497 2,048
93.3 % 92.9 % 87.9 %
Appendix B: Robustness analysis of the Ex-Post perspective: weighted sample of
distressed firms
Since Orbis is a commercial database, our sample may not be representative of the
whole population of Spanish, French and British firms. This may be especially prob-
lematic for distressed firms because of the rarity of bankruptcy filings and for micro
firms because of their low coverage in databases on firm annual accounts. In order
to increase the representativeness and external validity of our results we construct
sampling weights using data from the OECD’s Structural and Demographic Business
Statistics (SDBS) and the Spanish Statistical Institute (INE). SDBS provides the dis-
tribution of enterprises in each economy by detailed industrial sector (up to 4-digit
level) and by size class,69 while INE has the distribution of Spanish bankrupt firms by
size and industry.70 Hence, by weighting our observations we can correct sampling
biases. A caveat of this approach is that, since the SDBS does not have information on
some industries,71 we must throw away some firms, ending up with around 136,000
observations of distressed firms.
Table 17 shows the number and percentage over the total number of distressed
companies of micro firms, by country, for both samples. Those percentages are some-
what higher in the weighted sample in the case of Spain and France, while they are
dramatically higher in the UK, indicating that micro firms are underrepresented in the
unweighted sample, especially in the UK.
Table 18 shows the number and percentage over the total number of distressed
companies of bankrupt firms, by country and by size, of both samples. In the case
of the unweighted sample, although the percentage of bankrupt firms is the low-
est for Spain, the differences relative to France and the UK are much smaller than
the differences in bankruptcy rates reported in the introduction (see Table 1). How-
ever, this is not longer the case in the weighted sample, where the percentages of
bankrupt firms in France and the UK are more than 60 times larger than that of
69 The size class breakdowns, according to the number of employees, are: 1–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–249, 250
or more.
70 Unfortunately we did not have analogous information on French and British firms. However, the exam-
ination of the sample (see below) revealed that the main source of sampling bias was the case of Spanish
bankrupt firms.
71 Specifically, the SDBS has no information on the following industries (ISIC Rev. 3): Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; Fishing; Financial Intermediation; Education; Health and social work; Other community, social
and personal service activities.
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Table 18 Number of bankrupt
firms and % over the total
number of distressed firms
Spain France UK
Panel A: unweighted sample
All firms 3,182 7,988 3,354
5.4 % 12.4 % 29.9 %
Micro 1,713 5,023 753
3.6 % 10.5 % 31.6 %
Non-micro 1,469 2,965 2,601
12.8 % 18.2 % 29.5 %
Panel B:weighted sample
All firms 3,052 7,431 3,040
0.2 % 12.8 % 36.6 %
Micro 1,642 4,643 674
0.1 % 12.4 % 36.5 %
Non-micro 1,410 2,788 2,366
1.1 % 17.9 % 37.7 %
Spain, in line with the differences in bankruptcy rates, and the percentage of Spanish
micro firms under bankruptcy is much lower than that of their non-micro counter-
parts, also in line with the aggregate evidence. Hence the oversampling of Spanish
bankrupt firms in the unweighted sample enhances the internal validity of our esti-
mations because, given the rarity of bankruptcy filings, a simple random sample will
not yield enough bankruptcies to implement statistical analyses, while the correction
of this sampling bias with the weighted sample ensures the external validity of our
results.
Let us now, as in Sect. 5.2, study the relationship between capital structure
and probability of bankruptcy. Table 19 shows, again as a benchmark, the results
of OLS estimation for the probability of bankruptcy of a micro firm using sam-
pling weights. Comparing it with Table 9 (no weights) we can see that results are
remarkably similar for Spanish firms: there is a negative and significant correla-
tion between Tangibility and the probability of bankruptcy, which is robust to all
specifications. The correlation is positive and significant in the case of the UK,
as it was in the unweighted sample. By contrast, the conclusions do change for
French firms: now such a relationship is not statistically different from zero in any
specification.
In the case of the consistent IV estimates, Table 20 corroborates the findings of
Table 10 (unweighted sample). Tangibility has a negative impact on the probability
of bankruptcy of a Spanish micro firm. The effect is statistically and economically
significant: a 1 % increase in Tangibility decreases that probability by around 0.002 %.
As the unconditional probability of those firms is 0.1 %, the estimated semielasticity
is 2 %. By contrast, the effect is positive in the UK and non-robust in France, since it
is insignificant in specifications (4) and (5).
The results for larger firms, which are displayed in Tables 21 and 22, confirm the
findings for the unweighted sample in the case of Spain: Tangibility has no impact on
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Table 19 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro firms (OLS) (weighted sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility −0.0004***
(0.0000)
−0.0004***
(0.0000)
−0.0004***
(0.0000)
−0.0003***
(0.0000)
−0.0003***
(0.0000)
Log (age) 0.0209***
(0.0042)
0.0181***
(0.0042)
0.0132***
(0.0042)
0.0132***
(0.0042)
Log (size) 0.0233***
(0.0037)
0.0302***
(0.0038)
0.0302***
(0.0038)
Limited liability 0.1255***
(0.0285)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 44,189 44,164 44,164 44,164 44,164
R-squared (%) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
France
Tangibility 0.002
(0.006)
0.000
(0.005)
−0.000
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.006)
Log (age) 2.774***
(0.514)
2.693***
(0.530)
2.503***
(0.596)
2.492***
(0.596)
Log (size) 1.365* (0.734) 0.256 (0.696) 0.225 (0.691)
Limited liability 7.481***
(2.653)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 42,408 42,405 42,405 42,405 42,405
R-squared (%) 0.00 0.37 0.45 1.24 1.28
UK
Tangibility 0.077***
(0.014)
0.082***
(0.014)
0.074***
(0.014)
0.076***
(0.013)
0.076***
(0.013)
Log (age) −4.736**
(1.877)
−4.046**
(1.847)
−5.770***
(1.734)
−5.779***
(1.736)
Log (size) 19.456***
(2.589)
16.195***
(2.460)
16.167***
(2.483)
Limited liability 5.229 (4.774)
Industry dummies (1digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 2,041 2,041 2,041 2,041 2,041
R-squared (%) 2.51 2.94 7.03 12.4 12.41
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 0.1 % (Spain), 12.4 % (France), 36.5 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: OLS. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
the probability of bankruptcy, since it is not statistically different from zero in any IV
estimation. By contrast, the effect is positive in the UK—as it was in the unweighted
sample—and non-robust in France, since it is insignificant in the IV estimation of
specifications (4) and (5), unlike the unweighted case. An interpretation of the contra-
dictory results for France is that the associations between the two variables found in
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Table 21 Marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-micro firms (OLS) (weighted
sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility −0.0028***
(0.0002)
−0.0029***
(0.0003)
−0.0027***
(0.0003)
−0.0027***
(0.0003)
−0.0027***
(0.0003)
Log (age) 0.2356***
(0.0483)
0.1707***
(0.0489)
0.1183**
(0.0516)
0.1210**
(0.0517)
Log (size) 0.3587***
(0.0528)
0.3242***
(0.0532)
0.3266***
(0.0533)
Limited liability 1.5896***
(0.3846)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 10,291 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285
R-squared (%) 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.32
France
Tangibility −0.004
(0.008)
−0.005
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.008)
−0.014*
(0.008)
−0.014*
(0.008)
Log (age) 2.381**
(1.012)
2.972***
(1.065)
1.753 (1.164) 1.735 (1.172)
Log (size) −3.198***
(1.190)
−3.979***
(1.272)
−3.955***
(1.289)
Limited liability 1.006 (3.131)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 14,790 14,790 14,790 14,790 14,790
R-squared (%) 0.01 0.25 0.73 5.58 5.58
UK
Tangibility 0.123***
(0.009)
0.130***
(0.008)
0.126***
(0.008)
0.121***
(0.009)
0.120***
(0.009)
Log (age) −8.705***
(1.373)
−6.595***
(1.421)
−8.139***
(1.326)
−8.113***
(1.328)
Log (size) −7.449***
(0.606)
−7.478***
(0.572)
−7.440***
(0.573)
Limited liability 17.422***
(3.895)
Industry dummies (1 digit) No No No Yes Yes
N 7,589 7,589 7,589 7,589 7,589
R-squared (%) 6.24 8.15 10.27 13.55 13.57
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 1.1 % (Spain), 17.9 % (France), 37.7 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: OLS. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
the unweighted sample were driven by some observations that were overrepresented
in such a sample.
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Table 22 Average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-micro firms (2SLS)
(weighted sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain
Tangibility −0.0015 −0.0019 −0.0013 −0.0014 −0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Log (age) 0.2211*** 0.1491*** 0.1005* 0.1034*
(0.0493) (0.0505) (0.0553) (0.0554)
Log (size) 0.3703*** 0.3342*** 0.3365***
(0.0541) (0.0546) (0.0547)
Limited liability 1.5948***
(0.3635)
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes
(1 digit)
N 10,291 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285
France
Tangibility 0.092** 0.096** 0.098*** 0.066 0.068
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.048)
Log (age) 1.841 2.508** 1.202 1.158
(1.125) (1.178) (1.272) (1.288)
Log (size) −3.632*** −4.226*** −4.180***
(1.167) (1.236) (1.253)
Limited liability 2.058
(3.315)
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes
(1 digit)
N 14,790 14,790 14,790 14,790 14,790
UK
Tangibility 0.280*** 0.272*** 0.253*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036)
Log (age) −10.398*** −8.321*** −9.536*** −9.516***
(1.637) (1.705) (1.391) (1.393)
Log (size) −6.712*** −6.892*** −6.869***
(0.582) (0.606) (0.605)
Limited liability 11.349**
(4.984)
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes
(1 digit)
N 7,589 7,589 7,589 7,589 7,589
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Unconditional probabilities = 12.8 % (Spain), 18.2 % (France), 29.5 %
(UK). All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level
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